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Abstract. - In France, primaries have become an important part of 
French party system. Recently, the process, used by different parties, has 
been opened also to sympathisers. Indeed, both the Socialist Party and the 
Republicans organised primaries in the 2017 presidential elections. This 
can be analysed as an expected step to address problems such as leadership 
and representativeness. In addition, this process is also in line with the 
personalisation that has become a characteristic of the Fifth Republic. 
However, after the collapse of the main parties in the last elections, the 
primary system seems to have entered in a crisis time. For this reason, this 
article will attempt to analyse the introduction of primaries in France with a 
particular attention on the last presidential election focusing on the 
similarities, differences, and effects in these two open selections. 
Keywords: France, primaries, presidential elections 
1. Introduction 
Although membership of the parties and their activism have declined in 
recent decades (Scarrow 2014; van Haute and Gauja 2015), the new 
typologies of «parties without partisans» have reacted by adopting new 
forms of internal democracy. Whilst these challenges have been framed as 
the manipulation of members by party leaders (Katz 2001), the increasing 
role of citizens in the leader and candidate selections is the most important 
improvement of parties in terms of expanding the inclusiveness of the 
decision processes. 
Early North American studies on the impact of the primaries have 
proven to be critical. Indeed, parties adopting primaries were defeated in the 
following general elections, especially when primaries were competitive 
and/or negative (Hacker 1965). After several decades, primaries are no 
longer an exclusive tool of North American politics. Indeed, several 
democracies use this mechanism for candidacy selection. Examples include 
Latin America (Carey and Polga-Hecimovic 2006), Western Europe 
(Barberà, Lisi and Teruel 2015; De Luca and Venturino 2015, 2017; 
Giannetti and Lefebvre 2015), Asia (Narita, Nakai and Kubo 2015), and 
Africa (Ichino and Nathan 2013).
In these new contexts, primaries appear to help parties to avoid 
internal conflicts in order to promote a new public image of the parties 
among members and supporters (Dalton and Weldon 2004). 
In France, for several years, the introduction of primary elections - a 
further symbol of the américanisation of political life - has been considered as a 
process with few prospects of success due to the characteristics of the French 
political and party systems (Lefebvre and Treille 2016). Nevertheless, primaries 
have become an important part of French politics, which have evolved over 
time (Rousseau 2015). In fact, for a long time, the selection of candidates has 
been characterised by closed forms available only to members. Recently, the 
process has become rooted in greater inclusiveness within the selection process; 
this has been achieved by opening up with sympathisers. In addition, even if at 
the beginning the primary process involved only left-wing parties, in recent 
years it has also involved right-wing ones. Indeed, both the Socialist Party (PS) 
and the Republicans (LR) used primaries in the last presidential elections. This 
can be explained as a necessary effort to cope with the leadership and 
representativeness problems that the traditional party organisations were unable 
to address in an acceptable way (Mény 2015). The adoption of primaries by the 
two major French parties to select the presidential candidate is also in line with 
the personalisation issue that, in the last decades, has become a clear framework 
of the Fifth Republic. Until 2017, although primaries weakened the policy-
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making role of parties (Avril 2015), this process was also analysed in order to 
understand how they enhance the promoters’ chance to win. This 
transformation provided several solutions in the past, but after the collapse of 
the historic parties in the last elections, the open primaries seem to have entered 
a difficult time in their survival. This is linked to the traditional parliamentary 
parties in France (Grunberg 2015). 
From this perspective, this article has not an explicatory aim, but 
rather intends to describe the development of primaries in France with a 
particular focus on the last electoral round, also suggesting some possible 
directions of investigations for future studies in the field. In detail, the 
article will explore the primary outcomes of the two major parties to 
understand the rules, the participation, and the competitiveness. The second 
section will analyse the French primary elections and their adoption. The 
third section will describe the case of the 2017 socialist primaries and the 
fourth will examine the centre-right ones. Finally, a general discussion will 
focus on the similarities and differences in these two elections.
2. The development of primary elections in France 
The first Presidential primaries. - In France, the first experience of primary 
elections occurred in 19951. At that time, the PS, after Mitterrand's retirement, 
was involved in a heated debate on the appointment of the new candidate. In 
fact, Jacques Delors' withdrawal from the race - the only candidate able to 
inherit Mitterand's leadership - reopened the competition within the PS, 
creating a leadership vacuum problem. Thus, in the first closed selection - 
where approximately 80,000 socialist members participated - on 3 February 
1995, Lionel Jospin won 66 per cent of the votes against the 34 per cent of the 
then former leader, Henri Emmanuelli. The unexpectedly huge gap between the 
loser and the winner, in front of a competitor who controlled the party, was 
attributed to Jospin's ability to better manage the presidential campaign. 
However, in the subsequent presidential election, he lost against the 
conservative candidate Jacques Chirac, obtaining 47 per cent of the vote in the 
runoff (Elgie 1996). This first primary was an historic moment for the PS, 
allowing the party to formalise the presidentialisation of the party with the 
investiture of the polls' favourite candidate rather than the party leader, who 
was until 1995 the natural candidate for the presidential election (Marlière 
2017). In addition, in the same year, Henri Emmanuelli gave up his leadership 

1 In the 1980s, one of the first to introduce the concept of primaries in France is Charles 
Pasqua, who proposes so-called primaires à la française within the then centre-right wing; 
cfr. Pasqua and Monzani (2015).
to Lionel Jospin to became the party leader. Subsequently, in 1997, Jospin 
became prime minister during France's third cohabitation government with 
President Jacques Chirac.
In the following presidential elections, the PS, after an internal debate, 
decided not to hold a new primary election. By 2002 Lionel Jospin, the 
outgoing prime minister, seemed to be the only candidate able to compete 
against the incumbent Chirac. However, Jospin in the presidential elections 
unexpectedly failed to pass the second round, overtaken by both right-wing 
candidates: Chirac, who was then re-elected as president, and the leader of the 
National Front (FN), Jean-Marie Le Pen (Lewis-Beck 2004). Furthermore, in 
the same period, two other parties experienced the primaries for the selection 
of the presidential candidate. The first, the French Communist Party (PCF), 
promoted an internal consultation to select the presidential candidate, where 
63,941 voters attended alongside approximately 138,000 members. Robert 
Hue, a former communist candidate in 1995, was selected by 77.4 per cent of 
PCF members and obtained just 3.4 per cent in the 2002 presidential 
elections. Secondly, in the spring of 2001, the Greens organised a closed 
primary where Alain Lipietz was nominated to be a candidate of the party by 
approximately six thousand members. In the same year, after a controversial 
position on Corsican nationalists, Lipietz was deselected in an internal 
referendum by 60 per cent of the voters. His candidacy was replaced by Noël 
Mamère, runner-up in the primary elections, who gained 5.5 per cent of the 
votes in the first round of the presidential election. 
The consolidation of closed-primaries. - The 2007 presidential election 
highlights an important breakthrough in the evolution of French primaries 
(Dolez and Laurent 2007). Indeed, the designation of Ségolène Royal - as 
socialist candidate to the presidential - during a close primary was 
characterised by three novelties: the absence of internal competition for the 
position of PS leader, at that time François Hollande; the mediatisation of 
the electoral campaign outside the PS; and the increase of membership, 
about 220,000 members compared to 120,000 registered in the Le Mans 
congress. Immediately, even before being appointed by militants, Royal was 
consecrated by the media and public opinion as a présidentiables candidate 
(Lefebvre 2011). Indeed, the former minister of Mitterrand's government 
imposed her candidacy for three reasons: an image of political novelty; the 
distance from the party apparatus; and her popularity in all the polls. In fact, 
Royal became the first Socialist female candidate with 60.6 per cent of the 
total vote by defeating her party’s elephants, Dominique Strauss-Kahn 
(20.8) and Laurent Fabius (18.6).
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At the same time, far from the media buzz, the other three parties 
applied closed primaries when choosing their presidential candidates. Firstly, 
the Greens, with approximately 5,000 participants, chose Dominique Voynet 
(45.7 per cent). He obtained only 1.6 per cent of the votes in the presidential 
elections. Secondly, the PCF organised an uncontested primary to select 
Marie-George Buffet, who gained 1.9 per cent of the votes in the next 
presidential elections. Finally, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) was 
appointed before Nicolas Sarkozy, with the votes of approximately 230,000 
voters (of approximately 340 thousand party members) between 2 and 14 
January 2007, and subsequently by acclamation within the Congress of 
January 14th in front of more than 100,000 members. In the first round of the 
presidential elections, Sarkozy gained 31.2 per cent of the votes, ahead of 
Ségolène Royal with 25.9. In the second round, Sarkozy became president, 
winning with 53.1 per cent of the votes ahead of Ségolène Royal with 46.9 
(Ivaldi 2007; Grunberg and Haegel 2007). 
From closed to open primaries. - The way towards a more inclusive 
participation in the candidate selection came in 2009 from the PS through a 
report by the French National Secretary for Renewal, Arnaud Montebourg, 
entitled Pour des primaires ouvertes et populaires. It was subsequently 
approved through the favourable vote of 68 per cent of members. In this 
document, Montebourg highlighted three main reasons to adopt the open 
primaries: the low legitimacy conferred by members only; the need to test 
the best candidate among a large number of candidates to allow increases in 
popularity; and overcoming the crisis of socialist leadership through the 
presidential primary. In the same year, the media coverage of the primary 
debate increased thanks to the support of several French personalities, such 
as sociologist Alain Touraine, and important political figures2. This pushed 
the then party leader Martin Aubry to accept a more inclusive process for 
the selection of the PS candidate. Thus, in 2011, the PS and the Radical 
Party of the Left (PRG) organised the first open primary, the so-called 
primaires citoyennes, to select their candidate for the 2012 presidential 
election (Audemard and Gouard 2014; Bergounioux 2011; De Luca 2014). 
After the first round with six candidates, François Hollande and Martine 

2 Cfr. Duhamel and Ferrand [2008], «Pour une primaire à la française», in Rapport de la 
fondation Terra Nova; Colin A.; Lanathoua M. and Chopin, D. [2011], «Des primaires à 
l'américaine pour le président de la Commission européenne: une révolution démocratique 
et stratégique?», in Rapport de la fondation Terra Nova; Ferrand O. and Montebourg A. 
[2009], Primaire: comment sauver la gauche, Paris, Seuil.
Aubry contested a runoff election in October 2011. Almost 2.9 million 
voters participated in the second round and Hollande won the primary with 
approximately 57 per cent of the vote, becoming the candidate of the PS and 
the PRG, and gaining the French presidency against Nicolas Sarkozy in the 
2012 presidential election.
However, in the 2012 presidential election, two other parties were 
also involved in the selection of their candidates. On the one hand, the PCF 
held an articulate process to choose the project of the Left Front (FDG), a 
leftist federation of parties, and to select Jean-Luc Mélenchon of the Left 
Party (PG) as the candidate for the presidential election, obtaining 59 per 
cent in the closed primary where more than 48 thousand members 
participated. In the presidential election, Mélenchon took fourth place, 
achieving 11.1 per cent of the vote, behind François Hollande, Nicolas 
Sarkozy, and Marine Le Pen. On the other hand, 25 thousand Green 
members chose Eva Joly as the presidential candidate through a two-round 
primary. The ecologist primary included the participation of the members of 
Europe Ecology - The Greens (EELV) and coopérateurs, i.e. the 
sympathisers, through a fee payment of 10 euros. Subsequently, Joly 
obtained only 2.3 per cent of the votes in the presidential election. 

Table 1 
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TAB. 1 - The presidential primary elections, 1995-2017.
Year Promoter Open / 
closed 
Fee Timinga Participation N. of 
candidate
s
Winner Final result 
     First 
round
Runoff    
1995 PS Closed - 2 79,345 - 2 Lionel 
Jospin
Defeat (T1) 
2002 The Greens Closed - 10 6,182 6,593 5 Alain 
Lipietz 
Replaced 
2002 PCF Closed - 6 63,941 - 2 Robert Hue Defeat (T1) 
2007 PS Closed - 5 179,412 - 3 Ségolène 
Royal 
Defeat (T2) 
2007 The Greens Closed - 9 4,917 5,356 5 Dominique 
Voynet 
Defeat (T1) 
2007 PCF Closed - 4 52,274 - 1 Marie-
George 
Buffet 
Defeat (T1) 
2007 UMP Closed - 3 233,779 - 1 Nicolas 
Sarkozy 
Elected 
2012 PCF Closed - 10 48,631 - 3 Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon 
Defeat (T1) 
2012 EELV Open 10 € 9 25,437 22,896 4 Eva Joly Defeat (T1) 
2012 PS, PRG Open 1 € 6 2,661,23
1
2,860,
157
6 François 
Hollande 
Elected 
2017 EELV Open 5 € 4 12,582 13,940 4 Yannick 
Jadot 
Withdrawn  
2017 LR, PCD, 
CNIP 
Open 2 € 5 4,298,09
7
4,388,
797
7 François 
Fillon 
Defeat (T1) 
2017 LaPrimai-
re.org 
Open - 4 10,676 32,685 12 Charlotte 
Marchandi-
se-Franquet 
Unqualified 
2017 PS, PE, 
PRG, FD 
Open 1 € 3 1,655,91
9
2,046,
628
7 Benoît Ha-
mon 
Defeat (T1) 
a: Months before the general elections. 
Source: PS, The Greens, PCF, UMP, EELV, LR, LaPrimaire.org.

After the 2012 presidential elections and Hollande's victory, the open 
primaries received more attention by becoming a key factor in the candidate 
selection process at local levels. In fact, in the 2014 municipalities elections, 
the two main French parties selected their candidates in several cities using 
open primaries (see Table 2). The PS held primaries in five cities on 13 and 
20 October 2013: Aix-en-Provence, Béziers, Boulogne-Billancourt, Le 
Havre and Marseille. The UMP organised primaries in Paris and Lyon. The 
transfer of this procedure at the local level for the 2015 municipal elections 
was also a democratic success. Indeed, local primaries seem destined for 
future application, because they were not envisaged as a duplication of a 
national process, but as a real democratic implementation based on the 
revitalisation of local democracy (Fekl 2015). However, while on the one 
hand communal primaries have improved local participation, on the other 
hand, they did not have any “magical effect” on local elections. In fact, a 
peculiarity of these municipal elections is that no candidate selected by the 
primaries has succeeded in winning in the mayoral elections. 
Tab2
To return to the national level, in the 2017 presidential elections, the 
open primaries have become the main selection tool both for the centre-right 
and the centre-left parties. In fact, as seen above, Table 1 shows four 
primaries. The EELV organised a primary to select Yannick Jadot who, 
however, withdrew his candidacy for the presidential election and supported 
Benoît Hamon after an electoral agreement with the PS. The online primary 
of the Association Democratech, so-called LaPrimaire.org, selected 
Charlotte Marchandise-Franquet who, however, failed to obtain the 
signatures needed to participate in the presidential elections. Finally we see 
the two primaries of the PS, on the model of the 2011 open primary, and the 
republicans who experienced for the first time an open primary for the 
candidate to the presidential election.  
3. The 2017 Primaires citoyenne 
Rules and candidates. - The very idea of primaries reinforces the 
importance of the presidential elections. However, for some scholars, 
primaries are a factor of depresidentialisation; by dividing the presidential 
candidacy from the party leadership, the primary elections open the way 
for the nomination of an outsider, weakening the power of the new 
president over his or her own party and vice versa (Dolez 2015). 
Regarding the PS, primaries became a central point of the socialist Statute 
after the 2012 Toulouse Congress (modified in the 2015 Poitiers 
Congress), where the PS included several articles in order to select its 
candidate through an inclusive process. The timing of open primaries for 
the presidential candidates is decided by the National Council of the PS 
through a timetable at least one year before the presidential elections (art. 
5.3.1). The minimum requirements for participation, such as being 
enrolled in the French electoral lists or being 18 years old by the day of the 
presidential elections or being enrolled in the promoter parties, need to be 
met in order to sign the statement of the principles. One must pay one euro 
(art. 5.3.2) and a national committee in charge of the organisation of the 
primaries must be established (art. 5.3.3).
Thus, the PS and its allies organised a two-round primary to select their 
candidate for the 2017 presidential elections. The 2017 open primary was held 
on 22 and 29 January 2017 on the basis of the 2011 model, in which François 
Hollande became the Socialist nominee and, after defeating the incumbent 
Nicolas Sarkozy, the new French president (Clift 2013). However, after his 
complicated presidency (Gaffney 2015), Hollande decided not to become 
involved for a second term in the 2017 presidential elections. In this context, 
the primaries were used as a solution to the socialist impasse and to contain the 
collapse of the consensus.  
The left coalition, the so-called Belle Alliance populaire (BAP), 
consisted of three others parties aside from the PS: the Ecologist Party (PE) 
created in 2015 to support Hollande after a split in the EELV following the 
decision to make alliances with the FDG; the Democratic Front (FD), a centre-
left French political party created by Jean-Luc Bennahmias in June 2014 with 
the contribution of the Union of Democrats and Ecologists (UDE); and the 
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TAB. 2 - The 2014 mayoral primary elections.
Municipality Promoters Open / 
closed
Fee Participation N. of 
candidates 
Winner Result 
    First round Runoff    
Aix-en-
Provence
PS Open 1 € 2,821 2,433 6 Édouard Baldo Defeat (T2) 
Béziers PS Open 1€ 1,119 - 4 Jean-Michel Du Plaa Defeat (T1) 
Boulogne-
Billancourt 
PS Open 1€ 679 - 3 Pierre Gaborit Defeat (T1) 
La Rochelle PS Open 1€ 3,656 - 2 Anne-Laure Jau-
mouillié
Defeat (T2) 
Le Havre PS Open 1€ 1,472 - 3 Camille Galap Defeat (T1) 
Lyon UMP Open 1€ 4,300 5,452 5 Michel Havard Defeat (T2) 
Marseille PS Open 1€ 20,731 24,037 6 Patrick Mennucci Defeat (T2) 
Paris UMP Open 3€ 23,300 - 4 Nathalie Kosciusko-
Morizet
Defeat (T2) 
Paris EELV Clo-
sed
- 580 - 8 Christophe Najdovski Defeat (T1) 
Source: PS, UMP, EELV. 

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collapse of the consensus.  
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Radical Party of the Left (PRG), the main ally of the PS since 1972. As for the 
candidacy, the requirements to become a candidate in the BAP were 
determined by the individual parties3. Thus, on December 2016, the High 
Authority announced the seven candidates accepted to run for the open 
primary: the former prime minister Manuel Valls, Arnaud Montebourg, Benoît 
Hamon, and Vincent Peillon for the PS; François de Rugy for the PE; Sylvia 
Pinel for the PRG; and Jean-Luc Bennahmias for the FD. 
Among the four socialist candidates, Valls and Montebourg also ran 
for the nomination of the socialists in 2011. In that race, Valls achieved only 
6 per cent of the vote in the 2011 primary, but after Hollande's victory in the 
presidential elections, he was first appointed as minister of the interior, and 
then prime minister. In the 2017 presidential elections, Valls, taking 
advantage of Hollande's crisis, participated in the primary as the expected 
frontrunner. Instead, Montebourg, the former minister of the economy, 
gained approximately 17 per cent in the 2011 primary. His candidacy was 
presented in response to the policy changes of Hollande. The third socialist 
candidate was the former education minister Benoît Hamon. He was another 
opposing candidate to Hollande with a leftist proposal on work policies. 
Both Montebourg and Hamon, after the first Valls government, clashed with 
Hollande over several economic issues. Indeed, after the internal crisis 
between the frondeurs led by Montebourg-Hamon and the pro-
administration wing led by Valls-Hollande, in the second Valls government 
they were not re-confirmed as ministers. This prolonged the conflict until 
the primaries. Finally, the fourth socialist candidate was Vincent Peillon, 
former minister of national education and MEP, in opposition to the left-
wing rebels led by Montebourg and Hamon. 
Participation in primary election. - Regarding the participation, the first 
problem in this new candidate selection was the number of polling stations. 
Indeed, only 7,350 polling stations were planned in the first phase and later 
7,208 polling stations were open during the primary (6,915 in Metropolitan 
France, see Table 3) compared to 9,425 in the 2011 primary and 10,228 in 
the primary of the right. Regard the turnout, in the first round there were 
1,655,919 voters, and in the second there was an increase that led to a 
turnout of 2,045,343. In general, the 2017 primary was characterised by a 
collapse of participation compared to previous experience. In fact, in the 

3 Socialist, for example, used the same rules of the 2011 primary: the support of 5 per cent 
of the members of the National Council; or parliamentarians, regional and departmental 
councillors in at least 4 regions and 10 departments; or mayors representing more than 
10,000 people in at least 4 regions and 10 departments.
first round of the 2011 primary elections, the turnout was 2,661,231, while 
in the second round it was 2,860,157.
Table 3 shows the number of electoral stations and the results of the 
participation in the first and second round aggregated according to the new 
13 metropolitan regions provided by the recent French reform. In general, 
the turnout is the first indicator to be analysed in order to better understand 
the importance of the primary elections. However, scholars have always had 
difficulty in calculating this figure. For example, in a closed primary, it is 
possible to use a party’s members lists. In an open primary, however, it is 
necessary to estimate the potential selectorate. Indeed, in this aim, Table 3 
presents the participation rate that is calculated as the primary turnout as a 
proportion of the total votes cast for the Socialist candidate in the first round 
of the 2012 presidential elections. 
The participation rate in the first round shows higher peaks in the 
regions where historically the PS has taken more votes, such as Ile de 
France (22.3 per cent), Bretagne (19.3) and Occitanie (19.1), while reaching 
a lower rate in Hauts de France (9.6), Corse (11.3) and Grand East (11.7). 
As for the second round, the turnout increased by approximately 400,000 
voters with a variation of between 2.6 and 5.6 per cent. The largest increase 
occurred in the regions where the participation rate was higher, such as in 
Ile de France (+5.6), Bretagne (+4.7) and Occitanie (+4.4), while it appears 
to grow less in regions where in the first round the participation rate was 
lower, except for Corse where it was +4.1. 
TABLE 3 - HERE
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TAB. 3 - Participation in the French Socialist Party presidential primary, 2017.
Region Polling 
station
Selectors
T1I
Participation
rate T1I (%) 
Selectors T2II Participation
rate T2II (%) 
Variation
(%)
Auvergne Rhône Alpes 779 189,346 16.9 232,767 20.7 +3.9 
Bourgogne Franche Comté 464 69,429 15.9 80,612 18.5 +2.6 
Bretagne 357 120,995 19.3 150,519 24.0 +4.7 
Centre Val de Loire 282 57,356 14.9 69,680 18.1 +3.2 
Corse 49 4,413 11.3 6,008 15.4 +4.1 
Grand-Est 479 81,885 11.7 103,717 14.8 +3.1 
Hauts de France 530 87,771 9.6 111,849 12.2 +2.6 
Ile de France 1,194 378,186 22.3 472,894 27.9 +5.6 
Normandie 312 77,482 14.6 94,083 17.8 +3.1 
Nouvelle Aquitaine 718 170,997 15.6 205,888 18.8 +3.2 
Occitanie 891 183,953 19.1 226,428 23.5 +4.4 
Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur
506 96,806 16.1 122,595 20.4 +4.3 
Pays de la Loire 354 102,133 16.8 125,052 20.5 +3.8 
France (metropolitan) 6,915 1,620,752 16.7 2,002,092 20.6 +3.9 
Note: I first round; ii runoff; the participation rate is calculated as the primary turnout as a proportion of the total votes cast for the 
socialist candidate in the first round of the previous presidential elections.
Source: PS. 

Results and primaries’ aftermath. - Regarding the primary results, Hamon 
won in the first round of the primary (36 per cent), followed by Valls (31.5); 
as neither of the two gained more than 50 per cent of the vote, a second 
round was held one week later. Montebourg gained third place (17.5), 
declaring immediately to vote for Hamon in the second ballot. The other 
candidates' results were: Peillon (6.8), de Rugy (3.8), Pinel (2), and 
Bennahmias (1). Of these minor candidates, Pinel and Bennahmias endorsed 
Valls for the second round; Peillon promoted the mobilisation of voters 
without expressing any endorsement; and de Rugy chose not to endorse 
Hamon but without directly supporting Valls.
Table 4 shows the results of the first round according to the regions of 
Metropolitan France. As shown, Hamon came first with respect to all the 
candidates except in Corse, where Valls prevailed, and Bourgogne Franche 
Comté where Montebourg was first. Kenig’s index (2008)4 is 0.521 at the level 
of Metropolitan France, reaching 0.533 in Grand-Est where the competition is 
more balanced, 0.531 in Bourgogne Franche Comté, and 0.528 in Provence-
Alpes-Côte d’Azur. While it reaches lower values in Corse (0.411) and 
Bretagne (0.469). The index indicates a moderately competitive race. 
tABLE 4 – HERE 

4 Kenig’s index varies between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1 and is calculated as the 
ratio between the effective number of candidates and their actual number.
Regarding the second round, after an increase in participation, 
Hamon was nominated as the Socialist candidate for the presidential 
election, winning the 58.7 per cent of the votes against the 41.3 obtained by 
Valls. Table 5 shows Hamon's result, who won in all regions except the 
Corse. For the second round, we have used closeness as a competitive 
indicator. The figure shows a high margin for Hamon, who reached the 
highest percentage in Bretagne (23.3 per cent), in Hauts de France (21.9), 
and Bourgogne (20.7), while tapering in Occitanie (11.7), Provence-Alpes-
Côte d'Azur (14.3) and Grand- Est (15.6). 
TABLE 5 - HERE 
The analysis of the results shows how Hamon obtained the highest 
percentages in the most urbanised areas such as: Ile de France, with territories 
like Seine-Saint-Denis and Paris; Hauts-de-France with Lille, Bretagne with 
Rennes; or Pays de la Loire with Nantes. Valls, on the other hand, was able to 
reduce the gap only in small circumscriptions, but tendentially in areas 
historically close to the right. In general, the whole of the north east showed 
low participation rates, with Hamon appearing to have benefited by voting 
patterns in areas historically close to the left (and ecologists), whilst Valls failed 
to convince a moderate electorate who, as we will see later, preferred Macron. 
In 2011, the difference between Hollande and Aubry was smaller than that 
shown between Hamon and Valls, and was much more tied to the candidates' 
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TAB. 4 - Competitiveness in the first round of the French Socialist Party presidential primary, 2017.
Region Valls Pinel Peillon de Rugy Montebourg Hamon Bennahmias Kenig 
index
Auvergne Rhône Alpes 30.8 2.0 6.6 3.9 18.2 37.4 1.0 0.520 
Bourgogne Franche Comté 26.3 1.8 5.6 3.0 34.1 28.1 1.0 0.531 
Bretagne 31.4 1.7 5.3 4.2 13.8 42.7 0.9 0.469 
Centre Val de Loire 32.3 2.0 6.3 3.6 19.6 35.1 1.0 0.526 
Corse 52.0 3.6 4.7 1.9 12.3 24.0 1.4 0.411 
Grand-Est 32.4 1.9 6.9 3.8 18.9 34.7 1.3 0.533 
Hauts de France 31.6 1.9 6.9 3.0 18.1 37.4 1.0 0.512 
Ile de France 30.6 1.8 8.4 4.2 16.1 37.9 1.0 0.525 
Normandie 30.3 1.9 6.9 3.5 18.3 38.0 1.1 0.518 
Nouvelle Aquitaine 33.3 1.9 6.6 3.4 17.0 36.9 1.0 0.507 
Occitanie 34.8 3.0 6.3 3.1 16.7 35.0 1.0 0.514 
Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur
33.0 2.0 7.0 3.6 18.4 34.8 1.2 0.528 
Pays de la Loire 30.5 1.6 6.6 6.7 15.5 38.1 0.9 0.526 
France (metropolitan) 31.6 2.0 6.9 3.9 17.7 36.9 1.0 0.521 
Note: Figures are percentages. 
Source: PS. 
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Results and primaries’ aftermath. - Regarding the primary results, Hamon 
won in the first round of the primary (36 per cent), followed by Valls (31.5); 
as neither of the two gained more than 50 per cent of the vote, a second 
round was held one week later. Montebourg gained third place (17.5), 
declaring immediately to vote for Hamon in the second ballot. The other 
candidates' results were: Peillon (6.8), de Rugy (3.8), Pinel (2), and 
Bennahmias (1). Of these minor candidates, Pinel and Bennahmias endorsed 
Valls for the second round; Peillon promoted the mobilisation of voters 
without expressing any endorsement; and de Rugy chose not to endorse 
Hamon but without directly supporting Valls.
Table 4 shows the results of the first round according to the regions of 
Metropolitan France. As shown, Hamon came first with respect to all the 
candidates except in Corse, where Valls prevailed, and Bourgogne Franche 
Comté where Montebourg was first. Kenig’s index (2008)4 is 0.521 at the level 
of Metropolitan France, reaching 0.533 in Grand-Est where the competition is 
more balanced, 0.531 in Bourgogne Franche Comté, and 0.528 in Provence-
Alpes-Côte d’Azur. While it reaches lower values in Corse (0.411) and 
Bretagne (0.469). The index indicates a moderately competitive race. 
tABLE 4 – HERE 
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4 Kenig’s index varies between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1 and is calculated as the 
ratio between the effective number of candidates and their actual number.
Regarding the second round, after an increase in participation, 
Hamon was nominated as the Socialist candidate for the presidential 
election, winning the 58.7 per cent of the votes against the 41.3 obtained by 
Valls. Table 5 shows Hamon's result, who won in all regions except the 
Corse. For the second round, we have used closeness as a competitive 
indicator. The figure shows a high margin for Hamon, who reached the 
highest percentage in Bretagne (23.3 per cent), in Hauts de France (21.9), 
and Bourgogne (20.7), while tapering in Occitanie (11.7), Provence-Alpes-
Côte d'Azur (14.3) and Grand- Est (15.6). 
TABLE 5 - HERE 
The analysis of the results shows how Hamon obtained the highest 
percentages in the most urbanised areas such as: Ile de France, with territories 
like Seine-Saint-Denis and Paris; Hauts-de-France with Lille, Bretagne with 
Rennes; or Pays de la Loire with Nantes. Valls, on the other hand, was able to 
reduce the gap only in small circumscriptions, but tendentially in areas 
historically close to the right. In general, the whole of the north east showed 
low participation rates, with Hamon appearing to have benefited by voting 
patterns in areas historically close to the left (and ecologists), whilst Valls failed 
to convince a moderate electorate who, as we will see later, preferred Macron. 
In 2011, the difference between Hollande and Aubry was smaller than that 
shown between Hamon and Valls, and was much more tied to the candidates' 
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TAB. 5 - Competitiveness in the second round of the French Socialist Party presidential 
primary, 2017.
Region Valls Hamon Closeness 
Auvergne Rhône Alpes 40.1 59.9 +19.9 
Bourgogne Franche 
Comté 
39.6 60.4 +20.7 
Bretagne 38.4 61.6 +23.3 
Centre Val de Loire 42.3 57.7 +15.4 
Corse 61.8 38.2 -23.5 
Grand-Est 42.2 57.8 +15.6 
Hauts de France 39.1 60.9 +21.9 
Ile de France 40.8 59.2 +18.5 
Normandie 39.7 60.3 +20.6 
Nouvelle Aquitaine 41.9 58.1 +16.2 
Occitanie 44.2 55.8 +11.7 
Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur
42.9 57.1 +14.3 
Pays de la Loire 40.2 59.8 +19.6 
France (metropolitan) 41.1 58.9 +17.8 
Note: Figures are percentages. 
Source: PS. 

influences in various territories. In this case, the polarisation between the pros 
and cons of the government nationalised the vote with the huge impact of the 
media emphasising the internal conflict (Lefebvre 2015). 
However, the main problem of the socialist primaries was not low 
participation, but rather high divisiveness after the vote. After several 
weeks, de Rugy announced his support for Emmanuel Macron, former 
minister of the economy, who founded an independent political party (En 
Marche!) before the presidential elections. De Rugy’s decision to break the 
engagement was expected by all the primary candidates; in order to support 
the winner, it caused an internal debate. The PRG, after a controversial 
period in which the possibility of supporting Macron was discussed, finally 
decided to respect the primary voting for Hamon. This confirmed the 
presidential support and created an agreement with the PS for the legislative 
elections. However, the most striking case was that of Valls’ statements, 
which announced a personal support for Macron without expressing the 
public engagement behind his candidacy. 
4. The first time of the right parties 
Rules and candidates. - The introduction by the French right of a more 
inclusive system to select one’s own candidate has been a long process. It 
was discussed again in the 2014 municipal elections in order to overcome a 
long internal crisis. By copying the PS model, on April 2015, the centre-
right parties discussed a general charter to organise a primary for the 
presidential elections. This was the first time that France’s centre-right had 
organised an open primary for the presidential elections, where any citizen 
signing a ‘statement of allegiance’ to the values of the right and paying a 
small contribution of two euros could participate (art. 2.2 of the Primary 
Charter). This important adoption has transformed the organisational model 
of the right-wing parties by engaging it in a competitive and regulated 
process (Haegel 2015). In this context, while the PS held its own primary 
elections in January 2017, the main centre-right party, the LR, the Christian 
Democratic (PCD, centre), and the National Centre of Independents and 
Peasants (CNIP) selected their respective candidates in a two-round system 
in November 2016.
Until the official closing date for candidacies, several politicians 
expressed their interest in running in the 2016 primary election. The LR 
required each candidate to obtain the sponsorship of 250 elected 
representatives (of which at least 20 had to be MPs) in at least 30 
departments and 2,500 party members in at least 15 departments (art. 4.3 of 
the Primary Charter). For the candidates of other promoter parties, the 
conditions of candidacy were adopted by the legislative organs of each 
party. Overall, seven candidates from the LR met the candidacy 
requirements: François Fillon, Alain Juppé, Nicolas Sarkozy, Nathalie 
Kosciusko-Morizet, Bruno Le Maire, and Jean-François Copé. Among the 
other parties, four members also requested to become candidates, but three 
of them were rejected; only Jean-Frédéric Poisson PCD obtained the 
candidacy. Thus, the first open primary of the centre-right had a total of 
eight candidates. 
Among the LR’s candidates, former prime minister and mayor of 
Bordeaux Alain Juppé was leading in the polls for several months. 
However, the other two main candidates, namely the former president 
Nicolas Sarkozy and François Fillon, former prime minister under Sarkozy's 
presidency, earned percentage points close to the vote. Thus, the primaries 
have become a means to settle scores within the LR party. However, while 
at the beginning the principal aim was to be open to all centre-right parties, 
the pre-organisation failed to obtain the participation of all forces of that 
political wing. Firstly, the Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI) 
decided not to present their own candidate in the primary, instead 
supporting Alain Juppé. This party, after the primary, although supporting 
François Fillon for the 2017 French presidential election, had several 
members of the party leadership who supporting Emmanuel Macron. 
Secondly, the Democratic Movement, (MoDem) led by François Bayrou 
also decided to endorse Alain Juppé. However, after his defeat, Bayrou 
announced his support for Macron in the presidential election. 
Participation in primary election. - Regarding participation, the 
organisation of the primary included 10,219 polling stations, of which 9,918 
were in Metropolitan France. This allowed 4,298,097 people to vote in the 
first round and 4,404,812 in the second. In general, the first presidential 
primary of the centre-right was characterised by a high participation rate 
when compared to the socialist primary. Table 6 shows the results of the 
participation in the first and second round in Metropolitan France. In this 
case, we can calculate the participation rate in the primary turnout as a 
proportion of the total votes cast for the UMP candidate in the first round of 
the 2012 presidential elections.
In general, the participation rate is very high compared to that of the 
PS. The average at the metropolitan level is 44.8 per cent. However, Table 6 
shows a peak in participation in the most urbanised region of the country: 
Ile de France (63.7). In addition, there are high values in several key regions 
in the political history of the centre-right, such as in Nouvelle Aquitaine 
56
influences in various territories. In this case, the polarisation between the pros 
and cons of the government nationalised the vote with the huge impact of the 
media emphasising the internal conflict (Lefebvre 2015). 
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Marche!) before the presidential elections. De Rugy’s decision to break the 
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period in which the possibility of supporting Macron was discussed, finally 
decided to respect the primary voting for Hamon. This confirmed the 
presidential support and created an agreement with the PS for the legislative 
elections. However, the most striking case was that of Valls’ statements, 
which announced a personal support for Macron without expressing the 
public engagement behind his candidacy. 
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right parties discussed a general charter to organise a primary for the 
presidential elections. This was the first time that France’s centre-right had 
organised an open primary for the presidential elections, where any citizen 
signing a ‘statement of allegiance’ to the values of the right and paying a 
small contribution of two euros could participate (art. 2.2 of the Primary 
Charter). This important adoption has transformed the organisational model 
of the right-wing parties by engaging it in a competitive and regulated 
process (Haegel 2015). In this context, while the PS held its own primary 
elections in January 2017, the main centre-right party, the LR, the Christian 
Democratic (PCD, centre), and the National Centre of Independents and 
Peasants (CNIP) selected their respective candidates in a two-round system 
in November 2016.
Until the official closing date for candidacies, several politicians 
expressed their interest in running in the 2016 primary election. The LR 
required each candidate to obtain the sponsorship of 250 elected 
representatives (of which at least 20 had to be MPs) in at least 30 
departments and 2,500 party members in at least 15 departments (art. 4.3 of 
the Primary Charter). For the candidates of other promoter parties, the 
conditions of candidacy were adopted by the legislative organs of each 
party. Overall, seven candidates from the LR met the candidacy 
requirements: François Fillon, Alain Juppé, Nicolas Sarkozy, Nathalie 
Kosciusko-Morizet, Bruno Le Maire, and Jean-François Copé. Among the 
other parties, four members also requested to become candidates, but three 
of them were rejected; only Jean-Frédéric Poisson PCD obtained the 
candidacy. Thus, the first open primary of the centre-right had a total of 
eight candidates. 
Among the LR’s candidates, former prime minister and mayor of 
Bordeaux Alain Juppé was leading in the polls for several months. 
However, the other two main candidates, namely the former president 
Nicolas Sarkozy and François Fillon, former prime minister under Sarkozy's 
presidency, earned percentage points close to the vote. Thus, the primaries 
have become a means to settle scores within the LR party. However, while 
at the beginning the principal aim was to be open to all centre-right parties, 
the pre-organisation failed to obtain the participation of all forces of that 
political wing. Firstly, the Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI) 
decided not to present their own candidate in the primary, instead 
supporting Alain Juppé. This party, after the primary, although supporting 
François Fillon for the 2017 French presidential election, had several 
members of the party leadership who supporting Emmanuel Macron. 
Secondly, the Democratic Movement, (MoDem) led by François Bayrou 
also decided to endorse Alain Juppé. However, after his defeat, Bayrou 
announced his support for Macron in the presidential election. 
Participation in primary election. - Regarding participation, the 
organisation of the primary included 10,219 polling stations, of which 9,918 
were in Metropolitan France. This allowed 4,298,097 people to vote in the 
first round and 4,404,812 in the second. In general, the first presidential 
primary of the centre-right was characterised by a high participation rate 
when compared to the socialist primary. Table 6 shows the results of the 
participation in the first and second round in Metropolitan France. In this 
case, we can calculate the participation rate in the primary turnout as a 
proportion of the total votes cast for the UMP candidate in the first round of 
the 2012 presidential elections.
In general, the participation rate is very high compared to that of the 
PS. The average at the metropolitan level is 44.8 per cent. However, Table 6 
shows a peak in participation in the most urbanised region of the country: 
Ile de France (63.7). In addition, there are high values in several key regions 
in the political history of the centre-right, such as in Nouvelle Aquitaine 
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(47.3), Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (46.9), Auvergne Rhône Alpes (44.3), 
Corse (43.7) and Pays de la Loire (41.8). The figures show a collapse in 
several other right-hand ramparts such as Bourgogne Franche Comté (36.3) 
and Grand-Est (33.4). As for the second round, there was a slight increase in 
the holdings, which recorded the largest variations in Nouvelle Aquitaine 
(+2.9), Bretagne (+2.8) and Pays de la Loire (+2.5). 
TABLE 6 - HERE 
Results and primaries’ aftermath. - The results show that, in the first round 
of the republicans’ primary on November 20, François Fillon won with 44.1 
per cent of the vote, while Alain Juppé came second with 28.6. Nicolas 
Sarkozy, shown by all the polls as second behind the favourite Juppé, who 
was projected to come in second, was eliminated with 20.7 per cent of the 
vote. The other candidates reached smaller percentages: Kosciusko-Morizet 
(2.6), Le Maire (2.4), Poisson (1.4), and Copé (0.3). Table 7 shows the 
results of the first round in Metropolitan France only. Fillon won in almost 
all regions with a percentage of between 42,0 (Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur) 
and 59.6 (Pay de la Loire), except in Corse where the winner was Sarkozy 
(43.6), and in Nouvelle Aquitaine which was assigned to Juppé (43.8). 
Kenig’s index is lower than that of the Socialist primary. Indeed, it is 0.444 
at the level of Metropolitan France, reaching higher values in Occitanie 
(0.456) and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (0.450), and lower values in Pays 
de la Loire (0.339) and Bretagne (0.406).
TABLE 7 - HERE 
In the runoff round, Fillon won with 66.5 per cent against Juppé. Table 
8 shows the data of the two candidates in the second round and the closeness, 
which illustrate how in the regions where Fillon achieved a higher score in the 
first round, he also maximised the vote in the second round. In Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur, the closeness between Fillon and Juppé was 50.6, and in Pay de la 
Loire it was 52.4. By contrast, the gap appears to be reduced in the regions 
where the challenger has a high level of competitiveness, such as in Ile de 
France (19.7) and Nouvelle Aquitaine (2.6). 
TABLE 8 - HERE 
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TAB. 6 - Participation in the Republicans’ presidential primary, 2016.
Region Polling 
station
Selectors
T1I
Participation
rate T1I (%) 
Selectors
T2II
Participation
rate T2II (%) 
Variation
(%)
Auvergne Rhône Alpes 1,241 514,452 44.3 518,712 44.7 +0.4 
Bourgogne Franche Comté 470 155,452 36.3 162,582 38.0 +1.7 
Bretagne 484 219,279 43.2 233,527 46.0 +2.8 
Centre Val de Loire 430 158,452 39.3 165,405 41.0 +1.7 
Corse 66 22,054 43.7 21,025 41.6 -2.0 
Grand-Est 950 288,263 33.4 290,731 33.7 +0.3 
Hauts de France 838 266,931 33.7 264,050 33.4 -0.4 
Ile de France 1,703 987,029 63.7 1,004,877 64.8 +1.2 
Normandie 536 197,045 38.2 203,934 39.5 +1.3 
Nouvelle Aquitaine 842 392,521 47.3 416,227 50.2 +2.9 
Occitanie 833 327,806 41.9 339,225 43.4 +1.5 
Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur
884 397,358 46.9 397,072 46.9 0.0 
Pays de la Loire 641 256,871 41.8 271,979 44.3 +2.5 
France (metropolitan) 9,918 4,183,513 44.8 4,289,346 45.9 +1.1 
Note: I First Round; II Second Round; the participation rate is calculated as the primary turnout as a proportion of the 
total votes cast for the UMP candidate in the first round of the previous presidential elections. 
Source: LR. 
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Results and primaries’ aftermath. - The results show that, in the first round 
of the republicans’ primary on November 20, François Fillon won with 44.1 
per cent of the vote, while Alain Juppé came second with 28.6. Nicolas 
Sarkozy, shown by all the polls as second behind the favourite Juppé, who 
was projected to come in second, was eliminated with 20.7 per cent of the 
vote. The other candidates reached smaller percentages: Kosciusko-Morizet 
(2.6), Le Maire (2.4), Poisson (1.4), and Copé (0.3). Table 7 shows the 
results of the first round in Metropolitan France only. Fillon won in almost 
all regions with a percentage of between 42,0 (Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur) 
and 59.6 (Pay de la Loire), except in Corse where the winner was Sarkozy 
(43.6), and in Nouvelle Aquitaine which was assigned to Juppé (43.8). 
Kenig’s index is lower than that of the Socialist primary. Indeed, it is 0.444 
at the level of Metropolitan France, reaching higher values in Occitanie 
(0.456) and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (0.450), and lower values in Pays 
de la Loire (0.339) and Bretagne (0.406).
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In the runoff round, Fillon won with 66.5 per cent against Juppé. Table 
8 shows the data of the two candidates in the second round and the closeness, 
which illustrate how in the regions where Fillon achieved a higher score in the 
first round, he also maximised the vote in the second round. In Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur, the closeness between Fillon and Juppé was 50.6, and in Pay de la 
Loire it was 52.4. By contrast, the gap appears to be reduced in the regions 
where the challenger has a high level of competitiveness, such as in Ile de 
France (19.7) and Nouvelle Aquitaine (2.6). 
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TAB. 7 - Competitiveness in the First Round of the Republicans’ presidential primary, 2016.
Region Fillon  Juppé  Sarkozy  Kosciusko-
Morizet
LeMaire Poisson  Copé  Kenig 
index
Auvergne Rhône 
Alpes 
46.5 26.1 20.1 2.8 2.6 1.6 0.3 0.437 
Bourgogne Franche 
Comté 
46.3 23.4 22.7 2.0 3.9 1.4 0.3 0.442 
Bretagne 49.1 29.5 14.9 2.4 2.3 1.6 0.2 0.406 
Centre Val de Loire 47.7 25.4 20.0 2.1 2.8 1.7 0.2 0.428 
Corse 25.1 26.7 43.6 1.1 2.2 0.9 0.3 0.439 
Grand-Est 45.7 24.7 22.9 2.3 3.0 1.2 0.3 0.442 
Hauts de France 45.7 23.7 24.4 2.2 2.4 1.2 0.3 0.438 
Ile de France 43.2 32.0 17.3 3.6 1.8 1.8 0.4 0.446 
Normandie 45.8 25.7 20.8 1.9 4.5 1.1 0.2 0.444 
Nouvelle Aquitaine 34.3 43.8 16.9 1.7 1.9 1.1 0.2 0.421 
Occitanie 42.4 26.8 24.7 2.4 2.3 1.2 0.2 0.456 
Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur 
42.0 20.8 31.0 2.2 2.3 1.2 0.5 0.450 
Pays de la Loire 59.6 22.1 12.5 1.9 1.8 1.8 0.2 0.339 
France (metropoli-
tan)
44.6 28.2 20.5 2.5 2.4 1.5 0.3 0.444 
Note: Figures are percentages. 
Source: LR. 
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TAB. 8 - Competitiveness in the second round of the Republicans’ presidential primary, 2016.
Region Fillon Juppé Closeness 
Auvergne Rhône Alpes 70.4 29.6 +40.8 
Bourgogne Franche Comté 73.8 26.2 +47.5 
Bretagne 66.5 33.5 +33.1 
Centre Val de Loire 71.1 28.9 +42.2 
Corse 71.0 29.0 +41.9 
Grand-Est 71.5 28.5 +43.1 
Hauts de France 70.0 30.0 +40.1 
Ile de France 59.9 40.1 +19.7 
Normandie 69.9 30.1 +39.8 
Nouvelle Aquitaine 51.3 48.7 +2.6 
Occitanie 68.8 31.2 +37.6 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 75.3 24.7 +50.6 
Pays de la Loire 76.2 23.8 +52.4 
France (metropolitan) 66.7 33.3 +33.5 
Note: Figures are percentages. 
Source: LR 
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In general, Fillon won by an even larger margin against Juppé. In 
Metropolitan France, of the two departments won by Sarkozy in the first 
round, all switched to Fillon in the runoff. Similarly, of the six departments 
of Nouvelle Aquitaine that originally voted for Juppé, only two remained 
loyal to Juppé. The other four switched to Fillon in the second round, 
allowing the acquisition of all regions (Fourquet 2017). 
Thus, the race to become the candidate of the French right ended 
with the extraordinary participation of over four million voters and an 
unexpected result, namely the nomination of François Fillon. His victory 
can be attributed to several factors, such as the capacity to bring together 
different positions of the centre-right wing with particular attention given to 
«establishment» and «identitarian» (Buhr 2017), and his image at least until 
the primaries as an honest politician. 
However, something changed for both the socialists and the 
republicans in view of the presidential elections. The next section will 
attempt to describe the impact of the presidential primaries and the possible 
consequences of a presidential low result. 
5. The impact of the primaries on the presidential elections: Socialists 
versus Republicans 
The runoff of the 2017 French presidential election was held between the 
top two candidates of the first round: Emmanuel Macron of En Marche! and 
Marine Le Pen of the FN. Macron became, with 66.1 per cent of the votes, 
the youngest president in French history5.
For the first time, none of the candidates of the two main parties 
entered the second round. François Fillon of the LR, after winning the 
primary elections, led the first round polls with Le Pen from November 
2016 to January 2017. However, after the so-called Penelopegate, the 
publication of information for which Fillon employed his wife in a fictitious 
job as a parliamentary assistant, Macron overcame Fillon in all the polls 
becoming the favourite in the first round. Finally, Fillon reached third 
position with 20 per cent, remaining out of the second round. On the other 
hand, the socialist candidate Benoît Hamon, after winning the primary, 
proposed forming a governmental majority with Jean-Luc Mélenchon of la 
France Insoumise (FI) and Yannick Jadot of EELV. However, while with 
Jadot there was an accordance, the alliance with Melenchon failed and the 
latter went into fourth place in the first round of the presidential elections 
(19.6 per cent). Hamon only reached 6.7, becoming fifth in the first round.  

5 Cfr. Macron E. [2016], Révolution. C’est notre combat pour la France, Paris, XO.
The results of the first round show a geographical and political split 
within France. Macron gained more votes in the west of France, in Ile de 
France and Savoie, while Le Pen gained more in the north, east, and 
southeast. The two major party candidates obtained poor results. François 
Fillon came first in only five departments of Metropolitan France: Sarthe and 
Mayenne in Pays de la Loire, Orne in Normandie, Haute-Savoie in Auvergne 
Rhône Alpes, and Lozère in Occitanie. He obtained the top score in his 
constituency, the department of Sarthe, where he had been a member and 
chairman of the General Council for a long time. Similarly, he achieved a 
high score in most of the territories usually close to the right (west of Ile-de-
France, around Savoie, Vendée, and the Côte d'Azur). He was heavily 
underrepresented, however, in respect of the national score in Seine-Saint-
Denis (where the radical left won) and in Picardie. Benoît Hamon, on the 
other hand, obtained the worst score of a socialist candidate in the presidential 
elections after Gaston Defferre in 1969. He did not win any departments but 
instead exceeded only 10 per cent in his department of birth, Finisterre in the 
Brittany region. More generally, the socialist candidate recorded the best 
scores in the west and in the centre of France, for example in Île-de-France. 
The main question now to understand,with due caution, is whether or 
not, in the regions where the two parties reached high participation rates and 
low levels of competitiveness in the primaries, the two candidates had better 
results in the 2017 presidential election. From the point of view of 
participation, Hamon scored the worst results in the regions where the 
participation rates in the primary election were lowest: Corse (3.7 per cent), 
Grand-Est (5.1) and Hauts de France (5.2). He recorded the highest 
percentages where the rates of participation in the primary were highest, such 
as in Bretagne (9), Ile de France (7.6) and Nouvelle Aquitaine (7.1). 
Regarding Fillon, he achieved better results, on average around (and over) 20 
per cent, in all regions where the participation rate of the primary was more 
than 40. For example, in Auvergne Rhône Alpes, Center Val de Loire, Corse, 
Ile de France, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, and, Pays de la Loire. At first 
glance, it appears that candidates achieved better results in the territories 
where participation in the primaries was higher than the national average. 
However, there are some exceptions that can be explained by looking 
at the dimension of competitiveness. Indeed, in some regions, the results 
reached lower percentages due to the large amount of internal divisiveness 
within primary candidates. This is the case in Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, 
where Hamon reached 4.1 per cent and Kenig’s index in the first round of the 
primary election was high (0.528), and closeness in the second round 
recorded a narrow margin. As for Fillon, the most interesting aspect is the 
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In general, Fillon won by an even larger margin against Juppé. In 
Metropolitan France, of the two departments won by Sarkozy in the first 
round, all switched to Fillon in the runoff. Similarly, of the six departments 
of Nouvelle Aquitaine that originally voted for Juppé, only two remained 
loyal to Juppé. The other four switched to Fillon in the second round, 
allowing the acquisition of all regions (Fourquet 2017). 
Thus, the race to become the candidate of the French right ended 
with the extraordinary participation of over four million voters and an 
unexpected result, namely the nomination of François Fillon. His victory 
can be attributed to several factors, such as the capacity to bring together 
different positions of the centre-right wing with particular attention given to 
«establishment» and «identitarian» (Buhr 2017), and his image at least until 
the primaries as an honest politician. 
However, something changed for both the socialists and the 
republicans in view of the presidential elections. The next section will 
attempt to describe the impact of the presidential primaries and the possible 
consequences of a presidential low result. 
5. The impact of the primaries on the presidential elections: Socialists 
versus Republicans 
The runoff of the 2017 French presidential election was held between the 
top two candidates of the first round: Emmanuel Macron of En Marche! and 
Marine Le Pen of the FN. Macron became, with 66.1 per cent of the votes, 
the youngest president in French history5.
For the first time, none of the candidates of the two main parties 
entered the second round. François Fillon of the LR, after winning the 
primary elections, led the first round polls with Le Pen from November 
2016 to January 2017. However, after the so-called Penelopegate, the 
publication of information for which Fillon employed his wife in a fictitious 
job as a parliamentary assistant, Macron overcame Fillon in all the polls 
becoming the favourite in the first round. Finally, Fillon reached third 
position with 20 per cent, remaining out of the second round. On the other 
hand, the socialist candidate Benoît Hamon, after winning the primary, 
proposed forming a governmental majority with Jean-Luc Mélenchon of la 
France Insoumise (FI) and Yannick Jadot of EELV. However, while with 
Jadot there was an accordance, the alliance with Melenchon failed and the 
latter went into fourth place in the first round of the presidential elections 
(19.6 per cent). Hamon only reached 6.7, becoming fifth in the first round.  

5 Cfr. Macron E. [2016], Révolution. C’est notre combat pour la France, Paris, XO.
The results of the first round show a geographical and political split 
within France. Macron gained more votes in the west of France, in Ile de 
France and Savoie, while Le Pen gained more in the north, east, and 
southeast. The two major party candidates obtained poor results. François 
Fillon came first in only five departments of Metropolitan France: Sarthe and 
Mayenne in Pays de la Loire, Orne in Normandie, Haute-Savoie in Auvergne 
Rhône Alpes, and Lozère in Occitanie. He obtained the top score in his 
constituency, the department of Sarthe, where he had been a member and 
chairman of the General Council for a long time. Similarly, he achieved a 
high score in most of the territories usually close to the right (west of Ile-de-
France, around Savoie, Vendée, and the Côte d'Azur). He was heavily 
underrepresented, however, in respect of the national score in Seine-Saint-
Denis (where the radical left won) and in Picardie. Benoît Hamon, on the 
other hand, obtained the worst score of a socialist candidate in the presidential 
elections after Gaston Defferre in 1969. He did not win any departments but 
instead exceeded only 10 per cent in his department of birth, Finisterre in the 
Brittany region. More generally, the socialist candidate recorded the best 
scores in the west and in the centre of France, for example in Île-de-France. 
The main question now to understand,with due caution, is whether or 
not, in the regions where the two parties reached high participation rates and 
low levels of competitiveness in the primaries, the two candidates had better 
results in the 2017 presidential election. From the point of view of 
participation, Hamon scored the worst results in the regions where the 
participation rates in the primary election were lowest: Corse (3.7 per cent), 
Grand-Est (5.1) and Hauts de France (5.2). He recorded the highest 
percentages where the rates of participation in the primary were highest, such 
as in Bretagne (9), Ile de France (7.6) and Nouvelle Aquitaine (7.1). 
Regarding Fillon, he achieved better results, on average around (and over) 20 
per cent, in all regions where the participation rate of the primary was more 
than 40. For example, in Auvergne Rhône Alpes, Center Val de Loire, Corse, 
Ile de France, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, and, Pays de la Loire. At first 
glance, it appears that candidates achieved better results in the territories 
where participation in the primaries was higher than the national average. 
However, there are some exceptions that can be explained by looking 
at the dimension of competitiveness. Indeed, in some regions, the results 
reached lower percentages due to the large amount of internal divisiveness 
within primary candidates. This is the case in Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, 
where Hamon reached 4.1 per cent and Kenig’s index in the first round of the 
primary election was high (0.528), and closeness in the second round 
recorded a narrow margin. As for Fillon, the most interesting aspect is the 
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result in Nouvelle Aquitaine, which despite one of the highest participation 
rates in the primary, reached one of the lowest performances (17.8). The most 
interesting element, in this case, is the high competitiveness of the two main 
contenders, bringing the closeness in the second round to 2.6. 
TABLE 9 - HERE 
Thus, although the analysis appear to link high participation and low 
competitiveness to greater levels of electoral performance in the 2017 
presidential elections, the data taken into account - only 13 cases, 
aggregated through the analysis of the 95 departments of Metropolitan 
France - makes it difficult to understand the real impact of participation and 
competitiveness, and their effects on the general elections. For this reason, it 
will be useful for future studies to analyse the correlation at a more 
disaggregated level, for example at least at the departmental level. In this 
descriptive analysis, it is therefore important to highlight several features of 
the last open primaries that are summed up in the next section.
6. Conclusion 
Several critical approaches describe the adoption of primaries into the French 
party system as a failure due to the different institutional and political contexts 
(Bonetti 2015; Mény 2015). The French primary is thus considered to be an 
insert from the North American model into a European system; this causes 
several problems. Firstly, while in North America the rules of primary elections 
are set by each state, in France the rules for candidate selection are decided by 
each party. Despite the fact that the reference model is that of the PS primaries, 
they do not have overall uniformity among themselves (Levade 2015). 
Secondly, the timing of the primary is on average a few months before the 
general elections, so they are not able to respond to unexpected events. Thirdly, 
the multi-party system impedes a simplification of competition and the two-
round electoral system is considered de facto as a type of primary (Mény 2017). 
More specifically, failure in general elections by candidates who 
have used the primary is due to a set of factors both internal and external to 
the primary process. As for the PS, the first factor affecting the 2017 result 
was the failure of Hollande's presidency. Primaries were used to relaunch a 
party that was collapsing in all of the polls. Thus, the socialists moved from 
the 2011 primaries when they were an opposition party with high chances of 
winning the elections, to the 2017 primary as a government party in the 
middle of a crisis and with little chance of gaining a good result in 
subsequent elections. 
The second reason concerns the victory of an unexpected candidate 
who caused the increase of internal divisions and the inability to find a 
solution. Indeed, as regards the PS, the performance of the party was 
influenced by the selection of a candidate considered as extreme, namely 
Hamon, who was unable to assemble the defeated candidates. Thus, after the 
PS primary, Valls and de Rugy supported Macron. On the other hand, in the 
LR party, after Sarkozy’s elimination, Alain Juppé was attacked because he 
was considered as too moderate, causing internal conflict. In addition, Fillon 
made an impact on the general performance inability of the primary 
legitimation to contrast with the pitfalls of the presidential electoral campaign. 
Indeed, the Penelopegate became the main issue covered in the electoral 
campaign. Fillon, after a great deal of party pressure, refused to withdraw 
from the competition and the primary system did not provide any rules of 
deselection in order to preserve the parties’ promoters. For this reason, many 
party members supported Macron and others supported Le Pen. 
Finally, although the unfortunate 2017 open primary elections 
caused problems for the main French parties, the extraordinary result of the 
2017 presidential election was characterised by the outsider candidate, 
Emmanuel Macron, and the high votes gained by right and left-wing 
populist candidates, Le Pen and Mélenchon respectively. 
From this point of view, Macron managed to gain moderate 
consensus from Hamon’s and Fillon’s disappointed voters. In addition, the 
presence of two very extreme candidates further eroded the extreme 
consensus of Hamon and Fillon. Mélenchon’s and Le Pen’s most 
intransigent programmes allowed extreme supporters to choose programme 
proposals closer to their attitudes than to those of the two most moderate 
candidates.
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TAB. 9 - Nominees’ results in the first round of the presidential election, 2017.
 Hamon’s result (PS) Fillon’s result (LR) 
Region Voters % Variation 
2012
Voters % Variation 
2012
Auvergne Rhône Alpes 256,532 6.1 -20.4 845,905 20.2 -7.2 
Bourgogne Franche Comté 87,386 5.7 -21.5 304,391 19.7 -6.9 
Bretagne 180,827 9 -22.7 380,815 19 -6.6 
Centre Val de Loire 83,552 5.9 -20.8 300,325 21 -6.9 
Corse 5,780 3.7 -20.5 39,453 25.6 -5.9 
Grand-Est 151,296 5.1 -18.2 586,390 19.7 -8.9 
Hauts de France 166,630 5.2 -22.7 521,373 16.1 -8 
Ile de France 430,324 7.6 -24.1 1,249,586 22.2 -6.8 
Normandie 113,705 6 -21.7 370,105 19.6 -7.5 
Nouvelle Aquitaine 240,157 7.1 -24.9 602,830 17.8 -6.5 
Occitanie 216,349 6.5 -22.7 566,036 17.1 -6.7 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 113,365 4.1 -17.9 615,524 22.4 -8.7 
Pays de la Loire 143,491 6.5 -21.9 516,428 23.6 -5.1 
France (metropolitan) 2,189,394 6.3 -21.8 6,899,161 19.9 -7.2 
Source: Ministry of Interior. 

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competitiveness, and their effects on the general elections. For this reason, it 
will be useful for future studies to analyse the correlation at a more 
disaggregated level, for example at least at the departmental level. In this 
descriptive analysis, it is therefore important to highlight several features of 
the last open primaries that are summed up in the next section.
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party system as a failure due to the different institutional and political contexts 
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insert from the North American model into a European system; this causes 
several problems. Firstly, while in North America the rules of primary elections 
are set by each state, in France the rules for candidate selection are decided by 
each party. Despite the fact that the reference model is that of the PS primaries, 
they do not have overall uniformity among themselves (Levade 2015). 
Secondly, the timing of the primary is on average a few months before the 
general elections, so they are not able to respond to unexpected events. Thirdly, 
the multi-party system impedes a simplification of competition and the two-
round electoral system is considered de facto as a type of primary (Mény 2017). 
More specifically, failure in general elections by candidates who 
have used the primary is due to a set of factors both internal and external to 
the primary process. As for the PS, the first factor affecting the 2017 result 
was the failure of Hollande's presidency. Primaries were used to relaunch a 
party that was collapsing in all of the polls. Thus, the socialists moved from 
the 2011 primaries when they were an opposition party with high chances of 
winning the elections, to the 2017 primary as a government party in the 
middle of a crisis and with little chance of gaining a good result in 
subsequent elections. 
The second reason concerns the victory of an unexpected candidate 
who caused the increase of internal divisions and the inability to find a 
solution. Indeed, as regards the PS, the performance of the party was 
influenced by the selection of a candidate considered as extreme, namely 
Hamon, who was unable to assemble the defeated candidates. Thus, after the 
PS primary, Valls and de Rugy supported Macron. On the other hand, in the 
LR party, after Sarkozy’s elimination, Alain Juppé was attacked because he 
was considered as too moderate, causing internal conflict. In addition, Fillon 
made an impact on the general performance inability of the primary 
legitimation to contrast with the pitfalls of the presidential electoral campaign. 
Indeed, the Penelopegate became the main issue covered in the electoral 
campaign. Fillon, after a great deal of party pressure, refused to withdraw 
from the competition and the primary system did not provide any rules of 
deselection in order to preserve the parties’ promoters. For this reason, many 
party members supported Macron and others supported Le Pen. 
Finally, although the unfortunate 2017 open primary elections 
caused problems for the main French parties, the extraordinary result of the 
2017 presidential election was characterised by the outsider candidate, 
Emmanuel Macron, and the high votes gained by right and left-wing 
populist candidates, Le Pen and Mélenchon respectively. 
From this point of view, Macron managed to gain moderate 
consensus from Hamon’s and Fillon’s disappointed voters. In addition, the 
presence of two very extreme candidates further eroded the extreme 
consensus of Hamon and Fillon. Mélenchon’s and Le Pen’s most 
intransigent programmes allowed extreme supporters to choose programme 
proposals closer to their attitudes than to those of the two most moderate 
candidates.
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